Opposition to MPEG-LA's
patent licensing
pool for implementers of the OMA DRM 1.0 standard is mounting, as trade
associations in the mobile industry and academic researchers have begun formally expressing concerns
about it. The Mobile Entertainment Forum (MEF) issued a
statement two weeks ago in
which it characterized the royalty terms as "onerous, impractical, and unclear."
Around the same time, two researchers involved in technology on which the OMA
DRM standards are based published an
article
in the EU-funded INDICARE Monitor questioning the validity of some of the
patents in the MPEG-LA pool. And last Friday, the GSM Association issued its own
statement,
calling the royalty terms "impractical, excessive and short-sighted."
MPEG-LA's proposed royalty scheme includes a fee of US $1.00 per handset and
1% of any transaction revenues from wireless content services that use the OMA DRM 1.0 standard. Several such services exist today.
The INDICARE Monitor article was written by Renato Iannella, currently a
researcher at the National Institute of Information and Communications
Technology in Australia, and Susanne Guth, a professor at the Unversity of
Vienna. Dr. Iannella is the inventor of the Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL),
which the OMA chose to use as the basis of the rights expression language (REL)
designed into the OMA DRM standards, and Dr. Guth is a Program Chair of the
International ODRL Workshops. Both are private contributors to the ODRL
Initiative.
In the article, Iannella and Guth attack not only the MPEG-LA royalty scheme
but also some of the specific patents in the pool -- ContentGuard's patents on
the use of RELs in DRM implementations, mainly U.S. Patent No. 5,715,403 and its
European counterpart EP 0 715 244 B8 -- for their validity in general as well as
their applicability to OMA DRM implementations in particular. Although
discussions of the '403 patent's applicability to OMA DRM have taken place in
private, this article is the first public assertion against this intellectual
property -- a warning shot across the bow that could lead to a drawn-out battle
in court.
As for the characterizations in the two trade associations' statements: at one level,
they amount to the usual posturing that
such organizations do on behalf of their membership, especially when it comes to
statements that the member companies themselves would find distasteful to make
in public. In this sense, these statements reflect
remarks that
executives of mobile device vendors made to the press a month ago.
Yet the GSM Association's statement goes further; it is stronger than the
MEF's call for more reasonable royalties and suggestions of other licensing
schemes as models. While acknowledging the drawbacks of proprietary
solutions compared to open standards, the GSM Association implies that any
royalties on DRM patents are unacceptable. It also calls for a review of
"credible alternative" DRM technologies for mobile content, with the goal of
recommending solutions to the Association's members as alternatives to the OMA
DRM standards, and it has set a deadline of next Monday (April 11) for DRM
vendors to submit proposals.
The GSM Association's statements are, of course, best viewed as a negotiating
gambit, especially since its proposed technology "beauty contest" pushes the
boundaries of some antitrust laws. If taken at face value, however, we would almost want to use the GSM Assocation's same characterizations ("impractical, excessive and short-sighted") to describe its own statement.
If mobile carriers end up
shying away from the OMA DRM standards and adopting proprietary DRM solutions,
then two things will probably happen. First, MPEG-LA -- or some subset of
its patent contributors, which include InterTrust as well as ContentGuard -- may
solicit the vendors and implementers of those proprietary technologies for
licensing fees instead. The patents in the MPEG-LA pool cover many aspects
of DRM implementation in general, not those that are specific to OMA DRM and not
just RELs.
Secondly, the odds are good that "credible alternative DRM solutions," as a
practical matter, means "Microsoft" -- an outcome that the mobile device
industry was presumably hoping to prevent through its rapid embrace of OMA DRM.
(Microsoft already licenses both InterTrust's and ContentGuard's IP.)
Prior to the advent of OMA DRM, there were a few vendors with proprietary DRM technologies for the mobile market, such as US-based Lockstream
(recently acquired
by conditional access vendor Irdeto Access). But these small vendors have
thrown in their lot with OMA; reverting to their proprietary technologies may be onerous for them and would, as mentioned above, be unlikely to
dodge the patent coverage issue.
For the mobile industry, the only outcome of this situation that would be worthwhile is the
negotiation of DRM patent royalties that device makers, software vendors, and
wireless carriers can live with. Certainly companies like ContentGuard and
InterTrust, whose core business is patent licensing, aren't going to go away.
And even if some subset of the mobile industry challenges ContentGuard's '403
patent in court, along lines that Iannella and Guth's article suggests, other
patents in the MPEG-LA portfolio remain at issue.
In this light, the GSM Association's stance also has a subtext of goading the OMA itself into getting directly
involved. The OMA -- not a very communicative organization to begin with
-- actually dissociated itself from this squabble in a
public
statement a month ago.
There are reasonable approaches to take in negotiating fairer royalty
schemes. One is to pass the royalties on to the content owners, who, after
all, have the only direct incentives to protect their content from piracy.
This is harder work, because it involves either keeping accurate records of the
ownership of content involved in mobile services -- or, if that's not possible,
instituting the kind of "dumb and easy" scheme that is the mirror image of the
device levies that no one really wants.
Another approach to more reasonable royalty schemes is one that encourages
the mobile carriers' experimentation with OMA DRM-based content services rather
than penalizing them for it. This could be done by eliminating the requirement
that the royalties be retroactive to all OMA DRM implementations and
establishing thresholds of revenues, subscribership, or device unit volume that
must be exceeded before royalties apply. Without provisos like these,
carriers and device makers have limited incentives for using the OMA standards.
At this moment, OMA DRM looks like the only viable alternative to a
Microsoft-dominated future for DRM in the mobile content industry -- especially
given Apple's lack of success in launching iTunes onto mobile handsets through
its stalled deal with Motorola. Competition is necessary to develop
consumer-friendly solutions, and even though several services can use the same
DRM and still compete with one another, competition at all levels of technology
can only improve matters for consumers and thus help dissuade them from
obtaining content illegally. And, of course, open standards like OMA DRM
intrinsically encourage such competition. Yet even Microsoft itself -- ever conscious of
antitrust scrutiny in Europe, where the OMA standards are most rapidly taking
hold -- should hope for a successful outcome to the negotiations between MPEG-LA
and the mobile industry.